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Thesis Code:

P. 572

Author (s):

Nasser Assadi Nazari

Title:

Coercive Diplomacy: Comparative Stady of American Politics Towards Iraq, Iybia and Iran

Supervisor (s):

Mahmood Sariolghalam

Advisor (s):

Asghar Eftakhari

Thesis:

M. A. Political Science

Date of Print:

Summer 2007

University:

IMAM SADIQ (AS)

College:

Islamic Studies and Political Sciences

Abstract:

Coercive diplomacy is a non-military strategy to persuade a target state to back down through threat rather than force. The main instrument of persuasion is punishment in the case of contravention of incentives of coercive state. Using force in coercive diplomacy is intended to deescalate the tension or conflict if it happens. Therefore, coercive diplomacy fails when the coercive state begins war. The main question of the present article is about the consequences of using coercive diplomacy by America against Libya, Iran and Iraq. We assume that changing the behaviors of those states that have disputes with America is a top priority of US foreign policy. Failure of diplomatic ways including coercive diplomacy as an intricate combination of force and diplomacy may pave the way for regime change policy in US foreign policy.

US coercive diplomacy against Saddam from 1990 until 2003 was not successful due to imbalance in US strategy. This stemmed from lack of proportionality between aims and tools of coercer on the one hand and absence of reciprocity on the other. US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a clear breakdown of coercive diplomacy. Although the first phase of coercive diplomacy against Libya (1990-1998) included the proportionality factor, it had not the reciprocity one. US strategy could benefit from three main and determining factors of success in the second phase that is proportionality, credibility of threat and reciprocity. Furthermore, domestic politics and economic vulnerabilities of Libya facilitated the success of coercive diplomacy. Consequently Libya accepted voluntary disarmament in December 2003.

US coercive diplomacy against Iran from 1990 until 2003 was not effective because she could not make the sanctions multilateral and legitimate. Moreover, Iran's economic and domestic vulnerabilities were not considerable. US sought ambitious aims in containing   Iran in this period and realizing them was too difficult regarding Iran's stance in domestic and foreign policy. Iran's adroit policy in this period restricted effectiveness of US policy and therefore coercive diplomacy against Iran could not bring success.

 

Key Words

Coercive diplomacy, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Credibility, proportionality, Balance

 

Updated  May. 2011

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